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Summary 
The author argt,~es thnt rhe problem of recognition of state sovereignty 
has been neglected in intemanonal law despite its essential significance 
for intemattonal politics. He examines lhe consequences of new 
developments and me political practice of recognition after rhe breakdown 
of Communism. General considerali.ons are . supQOrted by a detailed 
analysis of the cases of recognition of post·USSR ana post· Yugoslav stares. 
The new practice of recognition has provided great momentum in the 
development of iruemalional law which is progre»ing towards full 
recogrulion of lhe right to self-dctcrtnination, inCluding a right to secede. 
Introduction 
According to Falk there is an emerging paradigm shift whereby the basis of 
international law in soverei~ statehood is withering away with lhc rise of 
aJremative 501.lcrures com~g to regulate international activity1• Nevertheless, 
the state is still the princtpal actor and therefore the law of recognition which 
determines the existence of a state "must be seen as the foundation stone of the 
edifice of international law".2 Moreover, the act of recognition reinforces the 
sovereignty of the recogniz.i.ng states. Yet for Lauterpacht. this area was "one of 
weakest links in international .law".' Brownlie describes theories about recognition 
as a "bank of fog on a still day".4 
1 Falk, R. , Revitalising lmcmational Law, (1989) 3. 
1 Dugard, J ., Recognition and the Unf~d Nations, (1987) 1. 
3 Lauterpacht, H., Recognition in lnfi'-17Mtional Law, (1947) 3. 
4 Brownlie, 1.. Recognition, Theory and Practice, in: The Structure and Process of 
lnternadonai Law: Essays in upi Philosophy, Doctrine and Theory. (1983) 627. 
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International law is the language and structure of international politics. Indeed, 
the mix between the theoretical law uf recognition and realpolitik recognition often 
resembles that of oil and water; rhe thin layer of theory on the top and often 
disguises the vast depths of realpolitik considerations. The \."Olume of state practice 
in relation ro recognition in the past 12 months has been greater than of Lhe 
previous four decades, inevitably resulling in considerable development in 
international law. This has been brought about by significant historical events which 
have altered the strucrure of Lhe world community. 
The end of world conflicts such as World War 1 and World War 2 and now 
Cold War, has resulred in the development of new strucrures in the geopolitics 
of rhe world and particularly of Europe which has been the r ulcrum of aU rhree 
conflicts. It is therefore not surprising that the cxic;rence of Yugoslavia which was 
created and recreated after each previous conflict, was again in question. Two 
of the three elements of glue that held the state together after World War 2, 
namely the Soviet threar and Tito, were gone. All that was left was rhe Serb-
dominated army (JNA), a cruel remnant of Stalin's legacy and an anachronism 
in the modem world. 
The death of Communism, which had over the years anaesthcised the nationalist 
s.entiments rhat exisLed in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Empire, enabled them to 
found new expression. The international community's response necessarily entailed 
the question of reco~ition in which poliricaJ factors proved not only influential 
but decisive. Thus unposing further impedimenrs along road to international 
recognition which consequently changed lhe law beyond "recognition". 
The principle of recognia"on 
Premature recognjtion gives rise to a delict in international law against an 
existing state. Art. 2(7) of lhe UN Charter prohibits intervention in rh.e domestic 
jurisdiction of any state. For this reason and the self-int•erested reason of self· 
preservation, states attach extreme importance to the principles of non-intervention 
and respect for the territorial integrity of states. Recognition is perhaps the mosr 
extreme fonn of intervention in another state's domestic affairs short of external 
aggression or direct armed aid to secessionist movements. 
In 1933, the Montevideo Con\'ention on The Rights and Duties of States 
articulated the four then·prevailing criteria fur Statehood. Manely; a permanent 
population, a defined territory, a government and the capacity to enter inro 
relations with other states. These provisions ignored the complexity of the highly 
charged subject of recognition. s Controversy arose over the question whether a 
polity complying with these criteria becomes a state (the declaratory theory) or 
whether the additional act of recognition by other states is required ro bestow 
international legal legitimacy (the constitutive theory).6 International legals scholars 
found themselves on diflerem sides t:.f the gr~at di\oide in rhe doctrine of recognition 
with politicians fovouring the co.1Slicutive schooL Although Lauterpacht foUowed 
• Bcrat, L., Review Essay·John Dugard's Recognition and the United Nations, (1989) 
24, Texas lnremacional Law Journal, SOl. 
6 Ibid. 
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the views of the constitutivists, he also insi~ted that states were legally obliged 
to recognize any poliry that met tJ1e requirements of statehood.' An overarching 
requirement is independence. 111 the Customs Regime case (1931) the Permanent 
Coun of International Jw;rice established that Independence exisr_s where a stare 
has over is no other authority othcr than that of intemarionaJ law. This was the 
reason advanced for the non-recognition of Manchukuo as a Japanese "puppet-
state" or of 1941 Croatia Democratic Republic was for a long time not recognized 
as a sovereign State because it was nor considered sufficiently indepedent vis-
a-vis the Soviet Union. 
The. _concepts of de jure and de facto recognition belong primarily to the 
recogrunon of governments. 
'The conditions under international law for the recognition of a new regin1e 
as the de faero government of a state are mal me new regin1e has in fact 
effective control of most of lhe state's territory and that this control is likely 
to continue. The conditions for the recognition of a new regime as de jwc 
government of a stare are that lhe new regime should nor merely have effecrive 
control over most of the !."tare's territory, but it should, in fact. be firmly 
e~1:ablished". a 
These concepts "have outlived whatever usefulness they may once have served'19 
particularly in Jight of Australia's recent decision to continue to recognize states 
but to no longer formally recognize governments, thus brin.ging it into line with 
the US and most countries of the EC. The rationale for the change was that it 
allowed quicker and more flexible reactions to international developments and 
avoided assumptions of approval of recognized re~es. This change in policy 
merefore provided a way out of the impasse with Fijt following the coups in 1987. 
Lorimer's doctrine of relartve recognition whereby different entities in 
international law can have different rights, along with Lauterpacht attempted to 
develop scientific rules of recognition so that it was nor merely a political acr.10 
However, recognition policies in relation to governments have also been rra.ined 
by politicaJ considerations. 
inconsistency in British recognition practice is evident in the long period of 
non-recognition of rhe effective East German and North Korean governments and 
the continued recognition of the Pal Pot regime ill Kampuches even when in 1979 
il was no longer in effective control of Kampuchea. The new recognition policy 
did not imply any change in Australia's attitude towart.ls Afghanistanor Kampuchea. 
Australia had refused to recognize the govenu11ent of Afghanistan since the Soviet 
invasion of 1980 and withdrew recognition of rhe government of Kampuchea in 
1981. The US only recognized regimes which were committed to bold free elections 
and to fulfil aJJ international obligations. Factors influencing US recognit:ion policy 
7 Lautcrpacht, H., Recognition in lncematioaal Law, 1947, 6. 
• Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the House of Commons on 21 March. 1951 
(Hansard, VoL 485, eo 2410: cited in earl Zeiss Stiftuns v. R.aynu & Keeler Led & On., 
1967; A. C. 853, 906 Per Lord Re.id). 
~ Ougard, J., Recognition and the Unired Nanons, 1987, 6. 
•• Lorimer. J ., Of International ~tion in General, Jnremadonal L?W. Vol 1, 101. 
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mcluded suppon for anti-monarchical govemmcrus, advancing American economic 
interests, promoLing constirutional government, reducing support for Axis powers 
in World War 2 and curbing Lhe spread of communism. Recognition policy also 
varied with region with recognition of Central and l.a tin American revolutionary 
governmentS based on more stringent conditions than rcoognition of European, 
African or Asian revolutionary regimes. Latin America Stares have also considered 
factors such as whether or not a government or whether or nor elections will 
be held, before extending recognition. In 1959 the Minister for External Affairs, 
Mr. Casey, explainin.g Australia's non-recognition of the People's Republic of China 
said that "a regime's capacity to govern is not the sol.e tesl for recognition by 
other govemmenlS".11 By 1974, however, rhe Australia posilion was that recognition 
and establishmenr of diplomatic re!ations were neutral acts, implying necessarily 
neither approval or disapproval of the government of counLiy concerned.n The 
minimwn oiteria for the policy of "universal" recognition of governments was said 
to be: the exercise of effective control; a reasonable prospect of permanence; the 
support of the population; and an expressed wiLlingness to fulfil international 
obligations.u The policy explains the recognition of the Pinochet regime in Chile 
and-the Whitlam government's recognition of the incorporation of the Baltic States 
inro rhe Soviet Union which was reversed when the Liberals came ro power. This 
policy was nor always strictly adhered lo as evident by Australia's recognition of 
the Viel Cong Government in South Viemam before the flnal collapse of Lhe Thieu 
Govcmmenl in May, 1975. The policy of "recognizing reality" was applied in 
recognizing the de facto absorption of East Timor into Indonesia and the 1979 
de jure recognition of Indonestan sovereignty.'' Only three years later Australia 
refused to recognize a milit:a:cy regime in Bolivia on the grounds that is bad reversed 
the democratic process. Ausrrallan and British refusal to recognize the Vietnamese-
backed regime in Kampuchea b 1980 because it came to power through outside 
intervention is conrradicted by recognitio11 in 1979 of the Lule administrarion in 
Uganda whose effectiYc conrrol was made possible by Tanzanian rroops. 
Therefore recognition has long bed a political act. In 1ns when France 
recognized the US, Britain consequenlly declared war. However, recent recognition 
practice, particularly in relation to the USSR and Y1.1goslavia, h:as challenged the 
traditional criteria for statehood which have been the means of recognizing a state. 
These criteria have previously come under serious question such as . when Israel 
was accepted into lhe UN whilst fighting still continued. This could be treared 
as an exceptional case. The US in recognizing Israel justified its action as •a practical 
step in recognition of realities". •s However, contemporary stare practise has 
provided a very broad, deliberate and articulated approach ro recognition which 
no longer reflects the traditional law for the creation of States. Again, politics 
has played a significanl role in this development. 
11 Charlesw?rth.. H., lhe New Australia Recognition Policy in Comparative Perspective, 




ts UN: Secunty Council 0/lidsl Records, No. 68, 3rd Year, 16. 
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The USSR: 711e Ba./o'c Smre.s 
In me 1920s the Baltic Stares were KCflcrally recognized as independent states 
and had diplomatic relations with several coururies including Australia. However, 
10 1939 they became victims of the Molotov pace between rhe Nazis and the USSR 
whereby mey came under the Soviet sphere of influence whkh was formalized 
after World War 2 when they became republics of me USSR. In 1988/ 89 they 
asserted their sovereignty and independence in light of Gorbachev's Glasnost 
policies. However, as recognirion is an acceplance of country's independence, they 
were not considered independent as long as Moscow asserted its authority over 
them. 
However, a distinction was made between de jure and de facto recognition. 
Most of the West, with me exception of Australia during the Wbirlam era. did 
not accept rhe de jure authority of the USSR over the Baltic States but did accept 
its de facto control. This was significant for the eventual independence of the 
Baltic Stales. When the Soviet coup of August 1991 collapsed, the Baltic States 
re-asserted their independence whid1 rhe West was now ready to accept. On 27th 
August, 1991 the EC did ool l!Se the word "recognition" bul said that it would 
emer into diplomatic relations with the Baltic StateS which could only be done 
with independent states. Similarly, rhe US and Australia did not have m recognize 
the Baltic States by virtue of their de jure recognition so il was only a question 
of entering into diplomatic relations. Recognition by the USSR was distinct as 
it had previously exercised its authority over them. 
For fear of instability by serting a dangerous precedent, the international 
community distinguished the situation of the Baltic SLates from the situation of 
Lhe other republics of the USSR and those of Yugoslavia. The Baltic States had 
been independent counties and their incorporation into the USSR had not been 
recognized and therefore they were viewed as having regained their independence 
when the USSR relinquished its corurol over them. Therefore the traditional rules 
of international law and practice were still to be applied to me remaining republics 
and to Yugoslavia. However, the traditional law did not accommodate those 
situations. 
The Soviet Republics 
A decisive factor in US recognition policy was the ovef2Tching thrust of Presidem 
Bush's finn connection with Gorbachev. Yet US could not recognize the Ballam 
republics and not do the same for the Baltic States as this would have undermined 
the Soviet President. Gorbachev declared Yugoslavia was a salutary warning for 
the USSR of a separath1. threat Stating "' will not be diverted from chis path one 
inch whatever the pressure pul upon me". 1~ His government Sl.lggested it would 
be in the Wcs~s interest to offer financial support for Gorbachev and his policies 
aimed at holding the country rogethe.r. Gorbachev was ,prepared to devolve 
substantial economic and political powers to the republics for the sake of preserving 
the union. US recognition policy was based on its determination that Gorbachev's 
success was essential lo US interestS and that he must survive his many crises, 
•6 Age. Melbourne, 7lh September, 1991. 
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including the BaiLie Stares' demand refusaJ to accept Soviet annexation of Estonia, 
J.arvia and Lithuania the US flinched from recognition uf rhe Baltics. US policy 
viewed Baltic aspirations as a threat eo Gorbachev more then as a legitimate 
demand for self-determination. 
Even wnen Russia recognized the Ukraine on 3rd December, 1991 the Wesr 
was still reluc.tanr ro act because Gorbachev was still in power and slill trying 
£O broker a new Union Treaty wirh various republics. Therefore the West viewed 
Russia's act as Ycltrin recognizing the USSR with only Russia's interestS in mind. 
By recognizing rhe Ukraine the \Vesr would have been effectively rejecring 
Gorbachev. It therefore refused to buy irlto the Yelt7in/Gorbachev power struggle 
until it became obvious that the latter no longer wielded power. 
On 8th December, 1991 Rl.lSsia1 the UkrAine and Byclorussla concluded an 
agreement effectively ceasing the existence of the USSR. Gorbachev resigned on 
the 25th December, 1991. The EC recognized the new republics. including Russia. 
but did not use the rerm •recognjtion" in relation ro lhc larrer. The EC noted 
the interestS, rights and obligations of the former USSR, including lhose under 
the UN Chaner, would continue ro be exercised by Russia. They welcomed d1c 
Russian government's acceptance of these commitments and responsibilities and 
in this capacity would continue their dealings with Russia caking account of the 
modification of its constitutional sratus. 
The US however, did use the term "recognition" in relation to Russia recognizing 
also d1e Ukraine, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Byelorussia, and Kirghizia. 13ush stated that 
the OS also recogni7.ed the independence of Moldova, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, 
1'adzikista.n, Georgia and Utbekisran but would establish relations with them "When 
we are satisfied that they have made commitments to responsible security policies 
and democratic principles".17 This is ' an Important distinction in terms of the way 
ln which international law is developing. The EC was nor able lO establish that 
all of irs criteria had been met in respect of these republics without further 
~-ubmissions. Australia did not initially recognize Georgia until 29th March, 1992 
after EC recognition on 23rd March. 1992, because it did not meet the old criteria 
of having a government. lt was in virtual anarchy with the government forcibly 
ejected by opposition forces. It was only when a new government was formed 
by former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze that recognition was 
exrended. In this regard the criteria ran parallel to the new criteria. 
Yl/GOSLA!aA 
Croatia and Sloven.ia 
Contributing to the momenrum of popular sovereignty through Eastern Europe, 
tbe Croatian and Slovenian people ousted rhe conununists frOm power in rheir 
respective republics in multi-party elections held in 1990. Overwhelming majorities 
at subsequent referendwns provided a mandare for me Declarations for 
Independence on 25th June, 1991. Both the Slovenian and Croatlan referendums 
left open the possibility of an alliance of sovereign states with other republics 
11 Age, Melbourne, 27th December, 1991. 
~. D. Tile Rocky Rood 10 -· CPSR. Vol. ;)(), NO 2. 11:193 pp, 193-1 25 
in line with the Croat-Siovenc proposal for rhe solution of the :;tate cnsu; m 
Yugoslavia of October, 1990. In Slovenia's referendum on 23rd 11ecembcr, 1990, 
93.2 % of all registered \'Oters took pan. Of those, 95 % vou~d in favour o f SJoveni.a 
becoming an independent sovereign state. In Croaria, 83.5 o/o of all registered vorers 
parricipated in the referendum on the 19th May, l99L Of these 93.2 % feverous 
Croatia becoming a sovereign independent stare.111 
Recognition policy Lowards the former Yugoslav's republics was obscured by 
hypocrisy. The inremarional communiry l>'USpected the country was dooml.>d bm 
refused to consider any alternatives and when rhe choice existed, mosr States 
continued ro assert they would nol recngnizc Croatian and Slovenim independence. 
Allemprs by such srares to keep Yugoslavia together will remain a testimony a 
muddled policy implemenled far too late and with a stubborn determination which 
defied realities and ultimately ha:;tened Yugoslavia's disinregration. 
As the conflict unfolded, many sra~es in unison and parrot-fashion repeated 
their demand that Yugoslavia must stay together and solve irs problems. The US 
adopted the stick approach by ceasing its small aid program. The EC opred for 
the carrot by signing a five year 607 million ecu loan agreement. Croatia wa:; 
admomshed by the US which said thou only if all parries agree can lhe federation 
relationship change. This effectively gave the Communists vero power over aU 
dialogue. Baker argued first in favour of Yugoslav unity and then appealed lO 
all sides to avoid the use of force thus putting the pm-Western govenunents of 
Croaria and Slovenia in the same basket as lhe neo-rommunists in Belgrade. 
The Australian government alone accepted lhe possibility of the inevitable break· 
up of Yugoslavia. However, statementS by Prime Minister llawke and Forejgn 
Minister Evans that Croatia and Slovenia would be recognized if they satisfied 
the requirements of independent statehood expressed the traditional view for what 
had been the criteria for statehood. No explanation was given as to why they 
didn'r meet these criteria. Primary emphasis was pul on the need for "an end 
to confrontation and a renewal of dialogue" (Senator Evans) and ·the in1portance 
of resolving the crisis "peacefully and in an acceptable and orderly fashion" (P. 
M. Hawke). 19 Australia rherefore adopted the American condition for recognition 
that independence must be achieved pcacefuUy. This ignored lhe possible use of 
the JNA to suppress the independence movemcnrs and hence prevent a peaceful 
settlement, which is what happened. The subsequent aggression resulred in Croatia 
losing control over one third of irs territory thus no longer satisfying the traditional 
crireria which ir possessed at the Lime of irs Declaration of Independence. lr any 
event. under the criteria of Defined Territory it is sufficient that there is enough 
certai:nry. Croatia's borders were intemarionally recognized under the Helsinki 
Process and 1990 Chaner of Varis for a New Europe and could nol be aJrered 
by act aggression. 
The Croatian Declaration of Independen~ states lhat rhe Declaration "begins 
the process of disassociation from the other republics" of Yugoslavia. The West 
therefore saw Croatia's independence as inchoate and accordingly did not respond 
18 CViic, C., Implications of the Crisis In South-Eastern Europe, Aldephi Papers, 1992. 
lf Moore, D., Slovenia and Croatia: When Should Australia Recogntte?, IPA 
Backgrounder, 3, 1991, 1. 
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favorably. Although Slovcnia"s Declaration acrual.ly stated rhat "Slovenia expectS 
legal recognition from other countries" ir recejved rhe same response. The 
Declarations were a process of independence because they acknowiL'tiged thar some 
issues remained to be resolved such as the stalus of the JNA in t11e republics 
and the division of common property. Rich is critical of Slovcnia for doing more 
than Croatia by actually taking over rhe border posrs by force.10 Yet, he secs 
Croaria's act of independence as in.crufficienr. He tdkes the American view saying 
"Perhaps Croalia should have tried harder with their negotiations and been more 
patient in the way they went about th.ings".21 This view ignores events in Yugoslavia 
before the Proclamarions of Independence. lt overlooks the referendums, proposals 
for confederation and numerous other negotiations which were rebuffed by the 
communist regime. 
The Declaration of Independence were in fact a culmination of a process of 
independence beginning weU before the Declarations. Moreover, they were a 
necessary action of both republics ro protect the interestS of rheir own nations. 
In 1989 Serbia annexed the autonomous provinces of Voyvodina and Kosovo 
without referendums and rhus automatically obtained three votes in the Yugoslav 
Presidency of 8 represenrarives. Serbia brutally suppressed the Albanians which 
comprise. 90 % of the population in Kosovo. These actions could be seen as a 
threat ro consrirutional provisions could be seen to have destroyed constiruti.onal 
validity lhus necessitating the republics Lo protect their citizens through secession. 
Milosevic embarked on a campai~ backed by the army which aimed at re-
centralizing Yugoslavi.a. After the elections in Croatia an armed rebellion, supponed 
by Serbia, was stag~d in a series of border districts where Serbs form a majority. 
This soon developed into a well-orchesuared attempt to destabilize Croatia with 
some regions declaring themselves paJ"f of Serbia, with the increasingly open 
backing of the JNA. 
Ancient differences accounr for a large pan of the present Lrouble but not 
all. There have been end~css disputes over the distribution of wealth and resources. 
Slovenia and Croetria being richer and more advanced have complained of having 
to subsidies the federal budge! which incl•Jdes the Serb o<:cupation of Kosovo. 
A deep cause of the war was the inability of a closed society to abide an opening 
to the light democratization. Slovenia began its search for a civil society several 
years ago-a sociery lndependenr of the stare nuher than an independent srate. 
Yugoslav society however, was kept closed by the weight of federc1l communist 
diciat:orship by the Serbian Conununists and anny. The Slovenians were faced 
with a Soviet dilemma. While the centre res~'ted democratization, ir was not 
possible to enjoy independence within their republic, let alone within the federation. 
At the same lime. Milosevic revived his party by exploiting the nationalist dream 
of Greater Serbia and by repudiating any demand for democratization as a 
malignant form of nationalism. It was therefore not just a war between nations 
but between an old <.'Ommunist acgime-centralized in the power of the Army and 
the Serb Government-and democratic movements. Many Serbians in Slovenia and 
Croatia, who voluntarily than m.der the diet.arorship of Milosevic, supported the 
idea of independence. 
20 Rich, R., Paper deJ:v~l ar Melbourne University. 1st June, 1992. 
11 Ibid. 
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Serbia's arrempts to keep the country rogerher had the conuary effect. Im1:ead 
of welconung of even consKienng rhe Slovene and Croat proposal for a looser 
confederal structure ,..;lh a single market and single currency, Serbia rejecting 
tt out of hand and ciWlg ever mote fiercely ro rhe idea of a centralized aulhoritarian 
umrary stare thereby altenau,,g the olher republics beyond recall even before 
inflicting the final blow by resorting to armed force. Year-long negotiations for 
a reformulation of relationships 11\ the federation were constantly met \-.ith nothing 
but smug inrransigence as there was no incentive for the Commumsrs m negoriate. 
Another faaor which mggered the independence decision was Serbtan economic 
warfare against Croatia and Slovenia particularly the imposition of duties on their 
goods and the coofascation of their propeny on Serbia. Moreover, Serbia 
perpetrated a financial raid on the Yugoslav National Bank 11\ December, 1990 
stealing half the money supply earmarked for the whole of Yugoslavia for 1991. 
A similar illegal operation was rnoWlred by Montenegro in early 1991 for the 
same purpose of obtaining fresh funds to pay the large inc.tcasc in wages and 
pensions rhar preceded elections in Serbia and Montcnegro which the Communists 
then won. 
The last straw for Croatia and Slovcnia was Serbia's decision, with the aid 
o( 1.hc votes of Montenegro, Kosovo and Voyvodina (all under Serb control) on 
the Yugoslav's stare presidency to block the election for a year of a Croarian, 
Stipe Mesic, as itS Chairman in line wilh procedures followed since Tiro's death.22 
Consenquenlly Croatia had Slovema had no alternative but to declare their 
independence. Yet the US was putting more pressure on Croaria rhan Milosevic. 
llaker acrually visited Belgr.lde and spoke of his country's commitment in keeping 
Yugoslavia together in :.pite of the obsrades the Serbs were putting in the way 
of letting rhe federal presidency work.. Baker's conuncnt.:. :.-unply encouraged 
Milosevic and his generals to become more cxncme in thetr demands. They felt 
safe in the knowledge that the US would hinder any recognition of Croatian 
independence by the EC. 
Furthermore, the republics conrinued !heir negotiations even after their 
Declarations of Independence. ln the Brioni Declaration !hey agreed ro a t:hree 
month moratorium on their Declarations of I.ndependence 11\ order for peace to 
be achieved. This did not revoke tl-eir Declarations of Independence. Nevertheless, 
states including Ausrralia conrinu~ to \-.ichhold recognition because mey now 
believed the Republics would possibly change lhcir minds during rhe interim period. 
The overriding reason the incrmarional collliDunity was reluctant ro recognize 
Croatia and Slovenia was to a\oid a violenr break-up of the So~t Union. Secondly, 
traditional criteria for recognirion did not accommodate the situation. The evenrs 
in the USSR soon reachcJ the point where the overriding reason no longer existed. 
The failed Russian coup signalloo Lhc end of the Soviet Union as several republics 
immediately asserted their independence. Huwever, caution still prevailed in the 
West. The US couJd nor recognize l11e ~altic Stales and could not do the latter 
whilst Gorbachev whom they strongly supported, was still resuscitating the Soviet 
Union. Moreover, the US was still bound by the Percentages Agreement concluded 
n Cviic, C., Implications or the Crisis in South-Eastern Europe, Adelphi Papers, 1991, 
86. 
1-Wl<~ 0 I ne RIIO<y Road 10 CI'Sil. VOl. JO, No 1 1993 pp 1~ 3< 28 
at Yalta afTer World War 2 whereby !:he superpowers racitly entered into spheres 
of inrerests agreements in which !:hey divided up Yugoslavia 50/ SO. It was only 
until it was dear char lhe Soviet Union could not be revived that the US decided 
to alre:r trs policy in relation ro Yugoslavia. 
The Ausrralian govenunenr was also reluctant ro recognize Croaria and Slovenia 
because it feared its actions could increase inter-el:hnic tension in Australia. Another 
reason for AUStralia's non-recognition was that ir was simply waiting for good 
company. ln October last year the Prime Minister said: '"'lbe govemmenr was 
reluCtant to recognize Croaria because of •he view that the Ruropeans should move 
firs~.23 Senator Evans also expressed an unwillingness for Australia to be the first 
to extend recognition. Moreover, he claimed Slovenia could nor be recognized 
because Australia may be forced to recognize Croatia as wt'll where the position 
was more ambiguous with minority Serb enclaves. Therefore it did not matter 
that Slovenia satisfied the criteria for sovereign statehood because political 
considerations L'Ontinued to dominate the question of recognition. 
International law as conservatively by Evans and Hawke did oot accommodate 
the situation in Yugoslavia thus necessitating substantial changes to the rules in 
order to enable appropriate international community reaction. Reinforced by 
subsequent state practice, the EC rewrme !:he crireria for statehood and thereby 
the Jaw of recognition in the Declaration on lhe Guidelines on !:he Recognition 
of New States in Eastern Europe and in rhe Soviet Union (15/12/91). The 
Declaration expressly rook into acrounr rhe "political realities in each case" and 
therefore politics again had a significant role in me determination of statehood 
and recognition. In the Declaration the EC ad:nowledged that rhe new states had 
constituted themselve~ on a democratic hasis and would exrend recognition upon 
certain conditions being met. These involved questions of human rights with 
guarantees for el:hnic minorities; respect for the inviolability of frontiers; acceptance 
of non-proliferation commionents and a commjonent to settling by agreement all 
questions conL-erning state succession. The Declaration unequivocally stated that 
"the Community and its member States will no; recognize entities which are the 
rcsulr of aggression". 
The EC also adopted a sep~tc Declaration on Yugoslavia which established 
an acrual mechanism for recognition whereby the Republics were required to apply 
for recognirion. Therefore unlike previously where states satisfied the criteria for 
statehood and then simply awruted recognition, the Yugoslav Republics were 
required to take a further step and pass a tesL Applications for recognition were 
senr to the Arbitration Commission established by the EC consisting oi 5 Presidents 
of Constitutional Courts from 5 counties of the EC and headed by French judge, 
Robert Badinter. Upon the Commission's ruling on !:he Applications, the EC Foreign 
Ministers met on the 15th January, 1992 to decide which republics would be 
recognized. By allowing rhe republics ro have international personality on the 
iruemational stage, they were allowing recognition to have a constitutive effect. 
Judge Bad.inter found a lacun-a in Croatia's Application in relation to proteCtion 
of human rights which was immediately to ensure domestic laws would be amended 
to rectify the shortcomings. Croatia and Slovenia were thus recognized on lSlh 
~ Age, Melbourne, 14,th October, 1991. 
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January, 1991 even rhough ir could be argued that Croatia did not fulfil lhe old 
criteria of possessing a defined territory with one lhird ~'till controllers by Serb 
irregular forces backed by the JNA. This was previously a major impediment ro 
recognition. Bosnia and Herzegovina was not recognized at the time because it 
had not held a referendum so the EC could not ascertain the wishes of rhe people. 
Macedonia satisfied all criteria bur was not recognized because of itS name.~ 
Political reasons essentially brought about the EC aaions which inevitably 
altered the law. On 15th December, 1991 the EC sought to avcn a damaging 
split over Yugoslavia by postponing for a month a final decision on recognition 
of Croaria and Slovenia. Gennany argued fiercely for immediate recognition and 
vowed to open diplomatic ties with Croatia unilaterally that week. The EC's decision 
to extend recognition on 15th January, 1992 on cenain condirions pursuant to 
the Declararions ended a splir berween Germany and most other counu·ics headed 
by France and Britain which wanted to delay recognition. The delay also appeased 
the US which opposed recognition arguing that remgnizin.g the Republic's too 
quickly would worsen rhe conflict-a view echoed by outgoing UN Secretaty-General 
Perez de Cuellar. Britain and France expressed the same view but 15th January, 
1992 "agrees to go along with the other 10 £C governmenrs tO preserve umty".25 
Bcsrua lllld Hera:govina 
In Bosnia and Hen~egovina a referendum on independence was boycotted by 
me large Serbian minority which compromises almost one third of the population. 
NeverTheless 63.4 % of the population voted with 99 % voting ''Yes". On 7th 
April, 1992 the US and EC recogni1.ed Bosnia and Herzegovina with Ausrralia 
following suit. This was done in the knowledge that government held no authority 
over itS territory which was being controlled by the SerlHJominatoo JNA. In this 
case, recognition was used as vinually the sole element in a consorurive merhod 
of creating a stare. The US was in the forefront of the recognition and led the 
push for meaningful sanctions against MiloseviC and his regime. 
11Je third 'Yugoslavia" 
On 29th April, 1992 Serbia and Monrenegro formed the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia claiming it to be the continuing state of Yugoslavia in a similar sense 
to that of Russia in relation Lo the USSR. Although the UN does not explicitly 
deny Belgrade's claims of inheriting "old" Yugoslavia's seat at the UN, Resolution 
757 states that Belgrade's attempt to continue the Yugoslav membership "has nor 
been generally accepted".26 The view which is being formed is that all the former 
republics of Yugoslavia should be equal successor st~tes. Moreover, if Serbia and 
Montenegro ignore the cease-fire and sanctions imposed by Resolution 757 because 
of continued fighting in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the UN would consider expulsion 
from the UN and possible military intervention. 
l< See discussion on Macedonia on next page 
lS Age, Melbourne, 16th January, 1992 (Emphasis added) 
16 Age, lst June, 1992. 
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Macedonia 
The t.reannent of Macedonia prcvcnrs there being too much confidence rhat 
the lesson of the paSt tragic 18 months has really been learned. This small former 
Yugoslav republic land-locked l>etween Greece, Bulgaria, Albania and Serbia, has, 
like Croalia and Slovenia asserred its independence after a referendwn. Moreover 
Macedonian President, Kiro Gligorov was able ro negotiate lhe withdrawal of the 
Yugoslav army from his COW1try without a shol being fired. The Macedonian 
Government was democratically elected and Macedonia has a Const:inJtion that 
guarantees rhe rights of ethnic rninoriries within its borde~. which it conrro.ls. 
All the conditions for recognition that the US and EC set as o~Tacles ro delay 
Croatian recognition laSt year were mer by Macedonia. Yet stiJI the politicians 
and diplomats of the West find a reason to defer acceptance of Macedonia into 
the international community. The reason is Greece, where a government with a 
parliamentary majority of Lwo has found in the very name Macedonia an issue 
it hopes may allow it LO cling to office al the next election. 
For Greece, Macedonia is a name to which it claims e;cclusive rights as some 
kind of memento of a long-gone glorious past. The Greeks claim the former 
Yugoslav republic has usurped the name of ancient Greek people to Lay territorial 
daims ro lbe Northern Greek region of Ma<:edonia. The Greek Government 
demands recognition should be denied until the name of the Republic of Macedonia 
is changed. Unfornmately, the EC. desperate ro have a united approach Lo foreign 
policy, has ignored lhe legal position and in its own self-interest has only take 
mlo account realpolitik considerations in order to appease a member State, for 
the sake of irs own preSl:rvation. In May 1992 the EC admitted that Macedonia 
satisfied all the criteria in relation lO statehood and met its own criteria for 
recognition bur refused ti recognize ir until "a name acceptable to all parties 
concemcd"27 is found. 
The ~-ue of oomenclarure remains the only impediment to the reeognition 
of Macedonia. The EC Declaration on Yugoslavia and Declaration on the Guide.lines 
on Recognition required the republics to com:mil themselves to adopt constitutional 
and political guarantees LO ensure they have no territorial claims towards a 
neighbooring State. Macedonia a<:.wally amended its conStitution to stipulate that 
it has no rerritoriaJ claims and will not take up hostile propaganda activities in 
reJation to a neighbouring stare, particularly a member of the EC. The President 
of Macedonia even wrole ro the EC unden:aki.ng never to conduct hostile 
propaganda However, hostile propaganda was inlerpreted to include the use a 
domination which according to Greece implied territorial claims. 
On 15th June 1992 EC Foreign MinisterS meeting in Luxembourg again failed 
to overcome a Greek veto againsl EC recognition of Macedonia. Greek Foreign 
Minister, Mr. Mirsotakis, repeated the Greek demand thal Macedonia change its 
name before it can be recognized by the EC. The decision the foreign Ministers 
had to make was not whether Macedonia sarisfied the ImemationaJ Law of 
Recognition but whether rccogniting Macedonia was worth a possible split in the 
EC. They decided it was not, especially when Greece threatened not to ratify lhe 
Maastricht treaty over lhe issue. Unforrunare!y for Macedonia the quesrion of irs 
., Declaration on rhe formu Yugoslav Republic of Maredonis, 4th May, 1990. 
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recogni•.ion is being determined in rhe midst of EC turmoil and uncenainry about 
its future. With the Danish rebuff ot the Maastricht treaty in a recent referendum 
and wirh furrher referendUfl"'.s still to be held in other member countries the EC 
succumbed to Greek threats of calling n referendum to deliberately undermine 
the treaty if the EC extended recognition. 
However, Greece's position h.1S earned it international scorn for its "the-name-
means-everything" stand on Macedonia as it has held up international rc<.'Ognition 
and aid for Macedonia. The Greek Government is engaged in a delaying racric 
which could touch off a full-scale multi national war in the Balkans. lt is standing 
by its position staunchly, arguing that the price of its vital support for sanctions 
against Serbia, which include stopping the flow of oil and goods from Greece's 
port in Salonika, is rhe refusal to accept any sovereign republic wirh the name 
Macedonia. The alliance Greece has with Serbia, about which the EC dares not 
ro have any qualms, is devastating the Macedonian economy just as assuredly 
as Serb tanks and m ortars are doing in Bosnia and Herzcgovina. Serbia has made 
ominous threars about sending back the army it withdrew and has blockaded 
Macedonia to the North. The Greeks have done the same in the South. With 
trade ground ro a virtual hair and denied access to the port of Salonika in Aegean 
Macedonia, the fledgling Macedonian democracy is under considerable strain. The 
Greeks have declared they will do evcrylhing in rheir power, even break the UN 
embargo on Serbia to prevent rbe creation of an independent republic on their 
northern border. The Greeks have already boycotted Dutch and lralian goods after 
their Foreign Ministers said they favorcd recognition of rhe republic of Macedonia 
This is an issue whidl holds such symbolic weight for the Greeks that it has 
overshadowed me Cyprus question_ 
For Lhe US the reason for making a mockery of its own principles governing 
recognition is again a political one. 11Us is a presidential election year and the 
Greek community in the US is both large and influential. I3aker makes soothing 
sounds in private when he meets Macedonian officials but will as nothing in public. 
The impasse on the recognition of Macedonia will continue until the political 
problems as opposed to legal questions are resolved. 
Effect on lnrernatioiUJJ Law 
Recognition is thus being used as an inst:rumcnt of foreign policy. The traditional 
criteria are not being as vigorously applied and are even overlooked. New 
conditions have been adopted such as the expression of democratic choice through 
referendwn and guarantees which regard to human rights and non-proliferation. 
The recognition of Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and l len:egovina, lithuan.ia, Latvia, 
E.~onia, Ukraine and all of the former Soviet Republics has provided great 
momentum in the development of international law which is progressing towards 
full recognition of the right to self-delermination, inc:Juding a rjghr to secede-
The doctrine of Uti Posseditis has been extend by the ICJ to the non-colonial 
context of internal borders of federal states.24 The r.c Arbitration Commission 
subsequently used the doctrine in respect of the republican borders of Yugoslavia. 
:m Rich, R., Paper ~~rt!d ar Melboume Unfr,-e£Sily, lsl June, 1992-
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Under t:he dOCtrine coloni~ boundaries in Latin America were sancrosanct to avoid 
bloodshed m border dtspures. The docrrine will no doubt be invoked in lhe 
impending break-up of the two pans of the Czechoslovakian federation and could 
alc;o be applied LO Canada. 
Personal political consk/eratiotJS 
As mentioned abo~e, Bush is loathed ro alienare his large Greek electorate 
particularly~~~ presidential election involves an appealing alternative to 
traditional polin<:_~ans m Ross Perot who is posing a considerable threat. However, 
electoral appcalthts nor irnporrant when l.he race ill not close. Bush showed in his 
1988 campaign at ~e was not unduly concerned about the East European ethnic 
vote and theref~re did ~r need ro budge from his ft.xarion with preserving central 
aurhority in diSi.ntegratmg countries. 
Muhiculturalism played a s1gnificant role in Canada's recognition of the Ukraine. 
A successful refer~~m on independence was held on lst December, 1991 in 
fulfillment of a cond_ition of Ukraine's earlier Declaration of Independence. Canada, 
where mulricUkuralism has a stranglehold on the political process and where 1 
million people of a population of 24 million claim Ukrainan origins, extended 
recognition the next day. 
For years US po~cy makers nurrumned Yugoslavia as a wedge in the communist 
world and developed beneficial personal relationships in the process. Deputy 
Secretary of sme Laurcnce Eagleburger developed quite a personal relationship 
with Mi!Osevic. He procur~ American loans for Yugoslavia and promoted Yugoslav 
expons ro me US and e9.)oycd special privileges when Ambassador ro Belgrade. 
It was thertfo~e no~ Slll'J?nsing that when the American Croarian Association lobbied 
the US AdJninistr300~ tt was always Eagleburger who found a reason why Croatia 
could nor be recogni2ed. 
DaYid Ande~ also a former US Ambassador to Belgrade (1981·85) and who 
conside~ YugoslilV!Cl as ~pan of me"B said that "Whether rhe Serbs were intent 
on creating a Greater Serbia at Croatian expense id open to question. . .. So, I 
would say, a plagUe on ~rh bouses".30 When Gorbachev and the Soviet Union 
were still in issue, Bush VJewcd the war in Croatia as "People (Croatians) using 
independence as an excuse to settle old scores'?' 
Condusion 
Any writf! who . an~pts to examine the mysteries of Slate practice on 
recognition Wlth t:he mrentton of providing a coherent explanation of the behavior 
and cxpeaatiOO;S ~;,r:~ Within a framework of legal principle and theory exposes 
h.imself t0 Cl!fWll flun;wc and vimperation. n This ill because Recognition "has been 
29 Asian W.U Saeet .lournill 
"'!bid 
" CN.N. 7V Rtpotr, Aug~~st 1991. 
n Dugard, J., Rt<»gnition and che Uniretl Naa·ons, 1987, 5. 
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a plaything for rhe poliLical scientist who have taken dclighr in posing abstrac.t 
problcliiS of a theoretical naturc".31 Therefore whilst inremationaJ lawyers would 
like ro believe that recognition has developed within the parameters of legal 
principle, recent state practice confirms that notwithstanding its pivotal position 
in international law, it is a uplaYthing" for politicians who choose the legal 
parameters wirhin which they wisk" to pfay. Consequently, the road LO recognition 
is made aJJ the more rocky. Acc.'Ording to The Late Honourable Fhilip C. Jassup, 
"He who travels a rocky road ro the end, merits more praise than he who drives 
his coach-and-four down the Champs Elysees".34 This certainly applies to Croatia 
more than any other srare because of the high price of international justice it 
had to pay with rbe worst destntction and human suffering since World War 2. 
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